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Abstract
We examine a crowdfunding platform that connects artists with funders. Although the inter-
net reduces many distance-related frictions, local and distant funders exhibit different funding
patterns. Local funders appear less responsive to information about the cumulative funds raised
by an artist. However, this distance effect appears to proxy for a social effect: it is largely
explained by funders who likely have an oﬄine social relationship with the artist (“friends and
family”). Yet, this social effect does not persist past the first investment, suggesting that it may
be driven by an activity like search but not monitoring. Thus, although the platform seems
to diminish many distance-sensitive costs, it does not eliminate all of them. These findings
provide a deeper understanding of the abilities and limitations of online markets to facilitate
transactions and convey information between buyers and sellers with varying degrees of social
connectedness.
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1 Introduction
Crowdfunding provides a method for artists and entrepreneurs to finance their projects, potentially
facilitating gains from trade that would not otherwise occur. It works by enabling small funding
increments (often as low as $5 in non-equity settings) through social networking platforms that
allow funders to communicate with each other as well as with funding recipients. Although small
in terms of overall economic activity, crowdfunding is expanding in the variety of sectors to which
it is applied as well as in the value of overall transactions (Lawton and Marom 2010). Furthermore,
there is increasing interest in the potential role it could play in early-stage finance. For example, in
April 2012, President Obama signed into law the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act with
the goal of reducing regulatory restrictions on raising capital for young and small businesses. While
at the time of this writing the implementation of key elements of the Act, such as legalizing equity
investments by non-accredited investors, still await the required rules to be set by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, many platforms are already growing exponentially, such as AngelList
(which currently only allows for equity investments by accredited investors) and Kickstarter (which
focuses on rewards for funders and does not allow equity investments).
We examine data from the first significant crowdfunding platform, Sellaband. The platform
was dedicated to new musical artists not yet signed to a record label, and enabled artists to raise
capital to finance the recording and production of an album. The company, headquartered in
The Netherlands at the time of our study, allowed for equity-like crowdfunding (through revenue
sharing) for approximately three years before being acquired by a German firm, at which time it
was subjected to stricter securities rules. We examine data on every investment transaction on that
platform during its first three years of operations.1
This new and rapidly evolving form of financing offers insight into a range of interesting questions
regarding the early-stage finance of projects and ventures. In Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb
(2013), we lay out the key economic features of these platforms, including the actors (entrepreneurs,
funders, platforms) and the incentives and disincentives facing each in terms of the attractiveness
1Although this platform was based on revenue sharing with funders, individuals may have invested for philanthropic
or other reasons besides pecuniary returns. This need not affect the interpretation of our main results. We address
this point in Section 2.1.
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of raising capital through crowdfunding relative to traditional sources of funding. In this paper, we
focus on two specific questions relating to information and reputation: How do local and distant
investment patterns differ? What might explain those differences?
A long literature suggests that (oﬄine) investments in early-stage ventures tend to be local
due to the importance of reputation and trust, which are especially important in the absence of
regulatory disclosures and oversight, and also because of distance-sensitive costs associated with
early-stage investments, such as identifying opportunities, conducting due diligence, and monitoring
progress (Lerner 1995, Sorenson and Stuart 2001, Florida and Kenney 1988, Sohl 1999, Nieuwer-
burgh and Veldkamp 2009, Seasholes and Zhu 2005, Tribus 1970). In the case of oﬄine funding,
reputation and trust are often built through interpersonal interactions which most commonly occur
between co-located individuals.
However, a striking feature of crowdfunding is the great distance between artists (and other
types of entrepreneurs) and many of the people who fund them. In this paper, we document
some of the key challenges of distant investments and explore the mechanisms through which they
have been overcome in the context of crowdfunding. We also speculate on the consequences of
these mechanisms for market outcomes. Thus, one of our objectives is to better understand how
crowdfunding platforms might generate challenges and opportunities for geographically isolated
funders and artists or other entrepreneurs.
On the Sellaband platform at the time of our study, artists needed to raise $50,000 before they
were able to access the capital. Individuals were funded in $10 increments and could purchase
as many “shares” as they choose during a single round of financing. In these data, the average
successful artist raises $50,000 from approximately 609 individuals over a one-year period. The
average distance between an artist and a funder is approximately 5000 km. Thus, distance does
not seem to be an important barrier to raising funds.
At some level this is unsurprising because crowdfunding platforms have three common properties
that are purposefully designed to overcome distance-related frictions: 1) easier search - they provide
a format for potential recipients of funds to present their projects online in a standardized and
comprehensive manner that makes search relatively easy, 2) less need for monitoring - they allow
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for small financial transactions (e.g., $10) to enable broad participation with limited downside
risk and thus lessen the need to monitor day-to-day activities compared to traditional funders of
early-stage projects and ventures (e.g., Lerner (1995), Gompers (1995)), and 3) information on
what others have done - they provide investment information (e.g., cumulative amount raised to
date and the online identity of current funders) and tools for funders to communicate with each
other. By enabling such activities and consistent with prior research in retail and advertising that
examines how the online setting allows people to overcome oﬄine barriers to market transactions
(Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Rahman 2009), crowdfunding platforms reduce market frictions associated
with geographic distance. Therefore, the importance of distance-related frictions in crowdfunding
depends on the tension between these distance “flattening” properties and the traditional needs of
early-stage funders.
To explore this further, we begin by focusing on the role of information about online investments
as conveyed by the amount of capital raised to date. This amount conveys information, such as
what other funders believe about the quality and potential of the project. The amount raised
may also convey other information that is distinct from the expected payoff, such as the extent
of the artist’s social ties. We discuss this alternative in the conclusions. Our primary focus on
the amount raised to date and our assumptions about the information conveyed is consistent with
prior literature that documents “herding behavior” in crowdfunding on Prosper.com and elsewhere
(Zhang and Liu 2012, Burtch, Ghose, and Wattal 2011, Freedman and Jin 2011). Our results
are consistent with this prior literature and show that investment propensity rises as an artist’s
cumulative capital raised increases.
To the extent that local funders have information advantages over distant funders due to oﬄine
access to the artist, they may derive less new information from knowing the amount of capital
raised to date. If so, then this would imply that local advantages related to search and monitoring
may still be salient in the early stages of a crowdfunding campaign.
We exploit this potential wedge in the value of posted information and compare how the timing
of local versus distant investments differs with the publicly visible amount raised to date. Specifi-
cally, we estimate the propensity of a funder to fund an artist in a given week, conditional on the
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amount raised, and compare propensities for local versus distant funders. We find that the timing
of distant, but not local, investments is very responsive to the cumulative level of funding already
raised. Thus, while many investments are distant, there is a qualitative difference between the
types of investments made locally versus those made over distance, and this difference seems to be
related to information.
After establishing a difference between local and distant investments, the remainder of the
paper explores the reasons behind this difference. We emphasize a social explanation for this
finding. Our results suggest that local funders differ from distant funders in their responsiveness
to the investment decisions of others because proximity enables social ties. The entrepreneurial
finance literature makes frequent reference to the role of friends and family (F&F) as an important
source of capital for early-stage ventures.2 Parker (2009) reports that 31% of start-ups’ funds come
from F&F. Researchers have emphasized F&F’s informational advantages concerning the quality of
the entrepreneur (Cumming and Johan 2009). Given the local nature of social networks (Hampton
and Wellman 2002), F&F tend to be disproportionately local.
We code each funder-artist pair with an indicator variable for F&F based on two measures: 1)
behavioral traits they exhibit on the website and 2) survey information from a subset of artists
who specifically identify their friends and family among their funders. We find that F&F are
disproportionately co-located with the artists they fund, although there are many local funders
who are not F&F and many F&F funders who are distant. We then compare how the relationship
between cumulative funding and the propensity to fund in a given period varies with distance
after controlling for F&F. The distance effect largely disappears. In other words, although local
and distant funders do display different investment patterns, this difference is mostly explained by
the disproportionately local nature of social relationships. Controlling for preexisting oﬄine social
networks, we see little difference between local and distant investment patterns.
We next examine the role social networks play in facilitating investments. The early stage fi-
nance literature emphasizes search and monitoring as two key information advantages of collocation
between funders and the people they fund. Social networks could substitute for the information
2Despite the acknowledged importance of F&F, few empirical studies focus on this form of investment, likely owing
to a paucity of data.
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provided by prior funders for either search or monitoring. It could be that prior funders help
prospective funders identify artists worth investing in and that social networks enable the same
phenomenon. It also could be that prior funders serve as monitors and that prospective funders
trust that those monitors will provide oversight to artists in the same way that social networks do.
We present evidence that monitoring is unlikely to explain the difference between investments
made by those inside and outside the artist’s social network. Specifically, exploiting the observation
that many funders invest more than once in a single artist over the duration of the fundraising
(i.e., before they reach $50,000), we examine the difference between F&F versus non-F&F funder
behavior for first versus subsequent investments. We find the difference is primarily driven by
the first investment a funder makes in a particular artist. Furthermore, artist activity on the
platform (such as posting videos and songs) does not seem to substantially alter behavior after the
first investment. If the difference is specific to the first investment, then it is likely related to the
information F&F funders have before investing in the artist on the platform. Thus, this information
appears to influence search rather than monitoring. The search information may a simple heuristic
that involves an invest/not invest binary decision based on a consideration set and the information
facilitated by social ties may influence which artists are in the consideration set.
We explore the possibility that non-F&F erroneously interpret F&F investment decisions as
signalling quality when in fact they may simply be the result of social obligation. Surely social
obligation plays some role in the investment decisions of F&F. However, given the significant
variation in artists’ ability to raise funds (thousands of artists raise almost nothing from anyone,
including F&F), it seems unlikely that there is no information in the investment decisions of F&F.
To examine this possibility, we show some suggestive (though inconclusive) evidence that funders
may partially discount the information in prior funding by F&F.
More broadly, we interpret our results to suggest that the crowdfunding platform eliminates
many distance-related costs normally associated with financing early-stage projects such as moni-
toring progress. However, it does not eliminate certain frictions that are associated with information
more likely to be held by socially connected individuals. This interpretation, which emphasizes the
importance of interpersonal relations in early-stage finance, is consistent with the findings of Nanda
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and Khanna (2010), who report that cross-border social networks play a key role when access to
capital is especially difficult. It is also consistent with models that emphasize the role of infor-
mation in explaining home bias in investments (e.g., Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009), French
and Poterba (1991)). As long as the information flowing through social networks cannot be easily
communicated online, distance will continue to play a role.
These results lead us to speculate that there may be path dependency in the process of accessing
distant funders online. To the extent that distant funders disproportionately rely on information
revealed in the investment decisions of others, F&F might play an important role in making early
investments that generate that information. Conti, Thursby, and Rothaermel (2011) argue that
investments by F&F can signal the entrepreneur’s commitment to the venture. To the extent that
any discounting of the information in prior funding by F&F is not complete, then this would imply
a limitation to the “equal access for all” potential of the internet. Communications technologies
enable artists and other entrepreneurs from anywhere to access capital globally, but in reality
only those with a sufficient base of oﬄine support may be able to do so.3 Focusing on the role
of distance, the results suggest that crowdfunding may indeed reduce distance-related barriers to
investment with at least one important caveat: market efficiency depends on whether there is
efficient information transfer from preexisting (oﬄine) social networks to the online global crowd.
2 Empirical Setting
2.1 Sellaband
Sellaband was an early and prominent crowdfunding platform. Launched on August 15, 2006, it has
been referred to as the “granddaddy of crowdfunding” (Kappel 2009). The company was founded
in Amsterdam with a mission to enable unsigned musicians to raise financing through crowdfunding
to record and produce an album.
3While such a pattern suggests potential returns to gaming the system, where artists (perhaps under a pseudonym)
fund large sums of money in themselves early and then pull that money out as other funders pile in, we find no evidence
of such behavior in our data. In particular, we see few withdrawn investments. The largest disinvestment in our data
is $450, and overall disinvestments of more than $100 are quite rare. Furthermore, disinvestment rates are lower for
F&F than non-F&F regardless of whether we define F&F by the survey or algorithmically.
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At the time of our data, the Sellaband website worked as follows.4 Artists set up a profile page
on Sellaband, at no charge, where they include a photo, bio, links, blog postings, and up to three
demo songs. Funders search the website, learn about these mucisians, listen to their demos and,
if they choose, buy one or more shares in an artist’s future album at $10 per share. Funders see
information posted by the artist as well as how much financing the artists has raised to date. Funds
raised are held in escrow and may not be accessed by the artist until they have sold 5,000 shares
(raised $50,000). Upon raising $50,000, artists spend the funds according to a plan they develop
for recording and marketing their album, which must be approved by Sellaband. They send vendor
invoices to Sellaband for payment. After the album is completed, the revenues from album sales
are split equally three ways between the artist, funders, and Sellaband. In this way, the investment
resembles a security. Funders also receive a compact disc (CD).
Artists on Sellaband face many of the same financing challenges and constraints as first-time
entrepreneurs in other settings. Thus, the platform is designed with features and protocols that
enable artists to conduct a range of activities that will support their fundraising efforts, such as
marketing their venture, presenting their budget, sharing their plan for promoting their future
album, and communicating directly with current and potential funders.
Because the individuals who fund Sellaband artists do so for many reasons, some pecuniary and
others not, we refer to them collectively as “funders” (as opposed to investors or philanthropists).
At the time of our data, Sellaband facilitates revenue sharing and thus funders can earn profits
if albums sell well.5 Of course, many funders may also have philanthropic or other utility-seeking
motivations. In fact, Sellaband refers to them as “believers.”6 However, even philanthropically
motivated individuals must allocate scarce resources. While they may not be focused on a pecuniary
return on investment, they are focused on some type of return on their investment and therefore
must select among many projects competing for their donations. Thus, Sellaband artists compete
4The website has changed substantially since September 2009, reducing the focus on early-stage artists, eliminating
direct revenue sharing, and allowing flexibility in the amount artists can raise and how they can use funds.
5Unfortunately, since the company’s change in ownership, we have not been able to obtain information on the
actual returns to investments in Sellaband.
6Some crowdfunding platforms are explicitly designed with philanthropic intentions. For example, Kiva, a platform
that focuses on lending to entrepreneurs in developing countries, does not allow lenders to charge interest and thus
provides no mechanism for earning a return on their capital. Galak, Small, and Stephen (2011) document that
crowdfunding on Kiva is a hybrid decision, with both reimbursement likelihood and charity as considerations.
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for funding. They pitch their projects and enter into contracts that commit them to sharing their
revenue with funders. This is true even for F&F: one benefit of crowdfunding in terms of raising
funds from F&F might be that the structure of the platform makes it easier to ask for money from
friends and family and commit to using it for a particular purpose. Even individuals who commit
funds to projects for non-pecuniary reasons are likely to be sensitive to the types of costs, such
as those associated with monitoring, that often favor financial transactions between co-located
individuals. Furthermore, early-stage, not-for-profit ventures seeking donors often face similar
criteria as for-profit ventures when seeking funding. (Katz 2006)7. Importantly, our interpretation
of the results does not rely on our decision to label them as funders. Whether they are funders,
believers, investors, or donors, the relationship between distance, social networks, and information
remains.
2.2 Data
Our dataset is provided by the company and drawn from their internal database. The dataset
contains every investment made on Sellaband from its launch in August 2006 until September
2009.
We combine this with geographic information disclosed by artists and funders on Sellaband.8
In our focal sample, we have distance measures for 90% of the artist-funder pairs. We also use data
on the cumulative investment raised by the artist from all funders as of the previous week, song
and video uploads that artists post on the platform, and funder proximity to concert locations (and
the dates of those concerts). Concert location data is found on the artist’s websites.
Over this period, there are 4,712 artists on Sellaband who receive at least one $10 investment.
Of these, 34 raise the $50,000 required to access their capital to finance the making of their al-
bum. The distribution of investments is highly skewed: these 34 raise 73% of the total $2,322,750
7“At the ‘venture’ end of the new philanthropy, the entrepreneurial techniques of venture capital are being applied
(Letts, Ryan, and Grossman (1997)). Donees are analogized to start-up firms, donors partner with them, establishing
specific and measurable benchmarks, and continuing their investments only if periodic goals are met” (page 1311).
8For artists, we crosscheck the locations they report on Sellaband with their official website, MySpace, and
Facebook profiles. We use Google Maps’ APIs to retrieve latitude and longitude for each location and to standardize
city names. Finally, we calculate geodesic distances between artists and funders using a method developed by
Thaddeus Vincenty and implemented by Austin Nichols (Nichols 2003).
8
invested on the platform. We focus our analysis on investments in the 34 artists who raise $50,000,
examining the timing of investment and types of funders. We focus on these 34 for several reasons.
First, they are more comparable with each other in terms of their performance because they have
each successfully gone through the full funding cycle. Second, we eliminate concerns about right
truncation of the data by focusing on artists who complete the funding cycle (Van den Bulte and
Iyengar 2011). Third, we have geographic location information for the vast majority of the funders
in these 34 artists because funders must give their location in order to receive their CD. Fourth,
focusing on these 34 eliminates artists who use Sellaband sporadically. Finally, because these 34
artists account for nearly three-quarters of all funds raised on Sellaband, little funding information
is lost by focusing on them (and robustness checks to other samples confirm this).
Artists enter the sample when they receive their first investment and exit when they reach the
target. The resulting panel is unbalanced. We identify every funder who invests at least once in one
of these 34 artists. Funders enter the sample when they make their first investment on Sellaband
(in any artist, including those that are not one of the 34) because their profile becomes visible to
artists and other funders at that time. Funders never exit the sample.
Our main sample of artist-funder pairs is the Cartesian product of the 34 successful artists
and all funders who invest at least once in one of them. Each pair appears during each week in
which both the artist and the funder are in the sample.9 Because we use artist-funder pair fixed
effects in our regression analysis, we drop pairs with no investments. There are 18,827 artist-funder
pairs with at least one investment from the funder in the artist and 709,471 artist-funder-week
observations.
We present descriptive statistics for the $50,000 sample in Table 1. Of these successful artists,
the average takes approximately one year (53 weeks) to reach $50,000, although there is considerable
variation around the mean from just under two months to more than two years. The source of
financing is widely distributed; on average, artists raise their financing from 609 different funders.
On average, funders fund 2.5 $50,000 artists, making 4.3 distinct investments (i.e., they often
9For example, if Artist 1 receives her first investment in Week 10 and reaches $50,000 in Week 20, then she will
appear in the sample from Weeks 10 through 20. If Funder 2 makes his first investment in Week 5, then he is paired
with Artist 1 for Weeks 10 through 20. If Funder 3 makes his first investment in Week 18, then he is paired with
Artist 1 for Weeks 18 through 20.
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provide funding on more than one occasion to a single artist).
Participants on the Sellaband platform are distributed over five continents in 80 countries,
with some concentration in western Europe and the eastern United States. Despite the wide
geographic variation, funders disproportionately fund local artists. Conditional on making at least
one investment in any artist on Sellaband, 3% of funders who are local invest.10 In contrast, only
0.9% of funders who are distant from an artist invest. Thus, funders are disproportionately local.
At the same time, there are many more distant funders, and therefore in aggregate they account
for the vast majority of total investments.
3 Empirical Strategy
Our econometric analysis is a straightforward framework at the artist-funder-week level. Funder i
will invest in artist a in week t if the expected value from investment is positive:
vait = βCumulativeInvat−1 + γXait + µai + ψt + ait
where vait is the value of funding artist a at time t by funder i. The value from investment includes
both the monetary expected return of investment as well as the consumption utility derived from
funding that artist. β is the perceived marginal value of cumulative investment as of the previous
week. For example, a higher cumulative investment may indicate that more funders perceive the
artist to be of high quality and therefore a better investment. Alternatively, funders may derive
more consumption utility from funding artists who are closer to the $50,000 threshold. In our main
specification, CumulativeInvat−1 is included as a vector of dummy variables defined by the $10,000
cumulative investment thresholds. In addition, γ is the perceived marginal value of the controls
(Xait) including a control for time since the artist began on Sellaband, µai is an artist-funder fixed
effect to control for overall tastes of the funder, ψt is a week fixed effect to control for changes in
the Sellaband environment over time, and ait is an idiosyncratic error term.
Because vait is a latent variable, we instead examine the decision to fund. Therefore, to under-
10In order to simplify the analysis, we group all artist-funder pairs within 100 km as “local” and all others as
“distant.” Our results are robust to other thresholds of “local.”
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stand the value to the funder in funding an artist a at time t, we use the following discrete choice
specification:
1(Investait) = βCumulativeInvat−1 + γXait + µai + ψt + ait
Consistent with the suggestions of Angrist and Pischke (2009), we estimate this using a linear
probability model. We show in the appendix that results are robust to a number of alternative
specifications. Likely because our covariates are binary, the vast majority of the predicted probabil-
ities of our estimates lie between zero and one. Therefore the potential bias of the linear probability
model is reduced in our estimation (Horrace and Oaxaca 2006). The fixed effects mean that our
analysis examines the timing of investment for artist-funder pairs where we observe at least one
investment. The fixed effects completely capture the artist-funder pairs in which we never see in-
vestment, and thus we remove these pairs from the analysis without any empirical consequences.
Standard errors are clustered at the artist level. We measure cumulative investment at the artist-
week level. Because the average artist in our main sample has more than 600 funders, no single
funder drives the cumulative investment number.11
In order to understand the role of distance, we separately estimate local and distant artist-funder
pairs.12
1(Investait) = β
lCumulativeInvat−1 + γX lait + µ
l
ai + ψ
l
t + 
l
ait if local
1(Investait) = β
dCumulativeInvat−1 + γXdait + µ
d
ai + ψ
d
t + 
d
ait if distant
Furthermore, in order to understand the role of F&F, we interact F&F with cumulative investment
in each of these separately estimated local and distant equations.
1(Investait) = β
lCumulativeInvat−1+θlF&Fai×CumulativeInvat−1+γX lait+µlai+ψlt+lait if local
1(Investait) = β
dCumulativeInvat−1+θdF&Fai×CumulativeInvat−1+γXdait+µdai+ψdt +dait if distant
11We address the potential bias from the use of fixed effects when several funders make only one investment by
showing robustness to random effects and to limiting the sample to funders who invest in the artist at least twice.
12We estimate these separately for clarity of presentation. All results are robust to using interaction terms in a
simultaneous estimation of local and distant.
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The main effect of F&F drops out due to collinearity with the artist-funder fixed effects. With this
empirical approach, we examine when a funder chooses to fund a particular artist, conditional on at
least one investment by that funder in that artist. Funders often invest more than once in the same
artist during a single $50,000 round of fundraising. We assume that the timing of investment is
driven by the change in cumulative investment rather than by another change that is specific to the
artist-funder pair. We also assume that the covariates, as well as the artist-funder and week fixed
effects, control for omitted variables. Our causal interpretation of the main results hold as long as
there is not an omitted variable that drives lagged cumulative investment, an increase in the value
of distant funding, and a simultaneous decrease in the value of local funding. One plausible variable
that might fit such a description is concert touring. As an artist gains visibility, they may be more
able to travel to distant locations. We therefore control for funder proximity to live performances
by the artist. The funder proximity to concert location variable is equal to one if the artist played
a concert within 100 km of the funder’s location during the week of the observation or the week
prior to the observation.
4 Results
We build our main result in steps. First, we document that funders’ propensity to invest in a
given artist increases as that artist visibly accumulates capital on the platform. Second, we show
that local funders deviate from this pattern; they are more likely to fund earlier in the fundraising
cycle. Third, we show that the difference between local and distant funders is largely explained by
the group of funders we label as F&F. Although we focus on a single specification in the paper,
we document in the accompanying appendix robustness of the results in each step to numerous
alternative specifications.13 In addition, to address the concern that our linear control for the age
13In the appendix, we show that our results are robust to alternative samples, covariates, and functional forms.
Specifically, in terms of the sample, we show robustness to the full sample (Table A-2), the sample of artists who reach
$5,000 in investments (Table A-3), the sample constructed by dropping artists from the music hubs of New York City,
Los Angeles, Nashville, London, and Paris (Table A-4), including only funders who fund two or more times (Table
A-5), and using artist-funder-month as the unit of analysis (Table A-6). In terms of covariates, we show robustness
to including video uploads (Table A-7), song uploads (Table A-8), both videos and songs (Table A-9), removing the
focal funder’s past investment from the artist’s accumulated capital (Table A-10), and including whether the artist
appeared in the Sellaband newsletter (Table A-11). In terms of the functional form, we show robustness to fixed-
effects logit (Table A-12), fixed-effects poisson regression on the total parts invested (Table A-13), linear regression
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of an artist’s Sellaband listing may not sufficiently capture overall time effects that may be correlated
with the profile of accumulated funds, we provide additional evidence that our estimated effects
reflect the information in accumulated funds by more flexibly controlling for a listings age, which
we do by employing a six-degree polynomial in age (Tables A-21 and A-22) and month-age fixed
effects (Tables A-23 and A-24). To shed light on the underlying mechanism, we present suggestive
evidence that it is unlikely that monitoring drives the difference in the pattern of F&F investments.
Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that later funders may discount the information provided
by prior F&F funding.
4.1 Investment propensity increases with funds raised
In Table 3 Column 1, we show that investment propensity increases as an artist accumulates
investment. As discussed earlier, the use of the $50,000 sample ensures this is not a simple selection
story where only the better artists appear in the sample with higher cumulative investment. Relative
to an artist with less than $10,000 in investment, a given funder is 2.1 percentage points more likely
to fund in a given week if the artist has $10,000-$20,000 and 8.4 percentage points more likely to
fund if they have more than $40,000. These increases are large relative to a weekly base rate of
4.1% during the first $10,000.
The observed acceleration of investment as an artist gets closer to $50,000 is consistent with
Zhang and Liu (2012), who document a similar pattern in the context of lending on Prosper.com.
This is suggestive evidence of path dependency: past investment by others may increase the propen-
sity to fund. While only suggestive in the absence of a truly exogenous shock to investment, the
underlying pattern in the data suggests that high levels of cumulative investment may cause an
increase in the rate at which new investment arrives.14
on the total parts invested and (when applicable) disinvested (Table A-14), and random effects (Table A-15). The
appendix also shows robustness of Tables 3 and 4 to alternative measures of “local” (Tables A-16 and A-17), treating
missing geographic information as distant (Table A-18), combining distant and local in the same regression and using
interactions (Table A-19), and alternative definitions of F&F (Table A-20. In addition, to address the concern that
our linear control for the age of an artists Sellaband listing may not sufficiently capture overall time effects that may
be correlated with the profile of accumulated funds, we provide additional evidence that our estimated effects reflect
the information in accumulated funds by more flexibly controlling for a listings age, which we do by employing a
six-degree polynomial in age (Tables A-21 and A-22) and month-age fixed effects (Tables A-23 and A-24).).
14Consistent with this interpretation, in Appendix Tables A-25 and A-26, we find that investment rates are higher
in the periods immediately following a large investment.
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4.2 Local and distant funders are different
In Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, we stratify the data between local and distant funders. Local funders
are more likely to invest during the first $20,000 than later. In contrast, the results for distant
funders resemble the results shown in Column 1. In Figure 1a, we provide a graphical representation
of this. Because we use a linear probability model, we can simply plot the estimated coefficient
values. Local and distant funders clearly display distinct patterns; distant funders’ propensity to
fund rises as the artist accumulates capital, whereas local funders’ propensity does not.
This general pattern holds across specifications except that, in several of the robustness checks,
there is a flatter relationship between investment propensity and cumulative investment for local
funders. Still, the key distinction for our purposes is that distant funders significantly increase their
propensity to fund as the artist accumulates capital, whereas local funders do not.
4.3 Friends and family
Next, we show that a particular type of funder, whom we label as F&F of a particular artist,
explains the observed difference between local and distant funders. Importantly, many F&F are
distant from their focal artist. Furthermore, many local funders are not F&F. However, F&F are
disproportionately local.
We report results using two different measures for F&F. First, we employ a proxy based on
funder behaviour. Second, we use a survey-based indicator where artists code each of their funders
based on their social relationship prior to joining Sellaband. For the proxy measure, we define F&F
as funders who have the following characteristics: 1) they invest in the focal artist before investing
in any other (i.e., the funder likely joined the system for the focal artist), 2) their investment in
the focal artist is their largest investment, and 3) they invest in no more than three other artists
(i.e., the focal artist remains a key reason for being on the site).
As a check on the validity of this measure, in Table 2 we examine whether F&F exhibit behavior
on the site that suggests they are a distinct group. Using our proxy measure of F&F, we find they use
the platform much less intensively than other funders for communication with the artists to whom
we assume they are connected, suggesting they have other channels of communication. In addition,
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they fund disproportionately early in the funding cycle. Finally, they are disproportionately local.
Regarding the survey-based measure, 18 of the 34 successful artists provide us with information
on the funders they know independently of Sellaband. Specifically, we sent each their list of funders
and asked them to identify everyone they knew prior to joining Sellaband. Our proxy measure
captures 84.1% of the funders identified by these 18 artists. 16.1% of those classified by the
algorithm are not identified by the 18 artists. Thus, by a surprising coincidence, the rates for false
negatives and positives are almost identical.
In Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3, we run our main specification on local and distant funders
but include an interaction of cumulative investment levels with an indicator for F&F. The results
show that local and distant funders are qualitatively similar in terms of the coefficient sign and in
terms of the relative magnitude of the main effect and the interaction with F&F. For both local
and distant funders, F&F tend to fund early in the funding cycle and non-F&F tend to fund later.
We illustrate this result in Figure 1b, which shows that non-F&F funders, both local and distant,
increase their propensity to fund as the artist accumulates capital, whereas F&F funders do not. In
Table 4, we show that the qualitative results are robust to the subsample of 18 artists who identify
their preexisting social relationships. Whenever we focus on this subsample in the tables, we use
the label ‘survey subsample’.
In summary, our results suggest little systematic difference in the timing of investments between
local and distant funders, except to the extent that social networks (as measured by F&F) are
disproportionately local.
4.4 What do F&F know? Identifying or monitoring worthwhile investments
Why do F&F exhibit distinct investment patterns? Perhaps they have certain information about the
artist that others do not. Consider two activities common among early-stage funders: identifying
worthwhile investments and monitoring the progress of those investments. Identifying worthwhile
investments is a search process that involves sifting through a wide variety of information to come up
with a smaller consideration set before making a decision. Monitoring involves continued interaction
with the recipient of funds and an investment response to the behavior of the recipient.
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In this subsection, we show that it is unlikely that the difference between F&F and other funders
is driven by monitoring. Instead, our results are more suggestive of F&F being different because of
information asymmetry related to the process of identifying worthwhile investments.
Specifically, we examine investments that occur after the first investment. The first investment
reveals when the funder identifies a project as worthwhile. Subsequent investments reveal how
additional information affects funder decisions. Therefore, we interpret the results on subsequent
investments as providing information on monitoring the behavior of the artists. Thus, if the differ-
ence between F&F and non-F&F funding persists after the first investment, then the results suggest
a role for oﬄine social networks related to monitoring and interpreting artist behavior rather than
a role related to identifying investments.
To further explore this, in Tables 5 and 6 we drop all first investments (and consequently all
funders who invest on only one occasion). With this subsample, we find that local and distant
funders follow a similar qualitative pattern: investments rise as the amount funded approaches
$50,000. Although the coefficient on F&F investments remains negative for high values of cumula-
tive funding, the main effect of the pattern has changed substantially. Specifically, adding the F&F
coefficients to the main effects demonstrates that after the first investment, all funders increase
their probability of investing in a given week as the accumulated capital raised to date increases.
This implies that, conditional on identifying an artist and deciding to invest in them, the online
tools for monitoring progress through the funding cycle (e.g., tools for posting progress updates
on new compositions, album artwork, media attention) seem to diminish the asymmetry between
F&F and non-F&F funders.
We interpret this to suggest that the results are unlikely to be driven by monitoring. If the
difference between F&F and non-F&F was due to monitoring, then we would expect subsequent
investments to exhibit similar patterns to the first investment. Tables 5 and 6 suggest otherwise.
In the Appendix, we provide further evidence that suggests no difference in the role of online
monitoring between local and distant funders or between F&F and non-F&F funders. In particular,
Appendix Tables A-27 and A-28 show that subsequent investments (whether local or distant) are
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not sensitive to artist postings of songs and videos.15 In this way, subsequent investments do not
seem to react to a straightforward form of monitoring.
Next, we look at differences between F&F and others for the first investment to look for sug-
gestive evidence that F&F do not search much on the platform before making investments. We
find that F&F first investments happen just 1.6 weeks after they join the platform. In contrast,
non-F&F first investments happen 6.7 weeks after they join.16 We also have aggregate data on the
engagement of funders on the platform as a whole. F&F interact less with artists online and they
spend less time on the platform overall.
Overall, we interpret the difference between first and subsequent investments to suggest that
monitoring is unlikely to explain differences between F&F and other funders. Instead, F&F funders
likely have additional information relative to non-F&F funders for identifying whom to fund. Sim-
ply, social ties yield awareness of the opportunity to invest (and perhaps exert some social pressure
to do so).
4.5 Do funders treat investments by F&F or large investors differently?
Given that F&F funders invest early because social ties yield awareness of the opportunity to
invest (and perhaps social pressure too), later funders should discount investments by F&F as less
informative about quality then other investments. While such investments are not easy to identify
on the Sellaband website, the identity of the most recent funders is prominent. If the most recent
funders have a clear connection to the artist (such as a shared last name that they choose to disclose
on their Sellaband username), then it is possible for a later funder to see that the artist’s recent
funds came from a social tie.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 explore this by looking at situations when the previous in-
vestment was an F&F investment. We identify whether the most recent week of investments in
the artist involved only F&F funders, both F&F and non-F&F funders, or only non-F&F funders,
leaving the dummy for non-F&F funders as the omitted group.17
15Appendix Table A-7 shows that overall investments are sensitive to video posts, especially local investments.
Appendix Table A-6 shows that investments do not seem to be sensitive to song posts.
16This is based on the survey sample data. The full sample yields a narrower but still substantive difference.
17Our data make it difficult to identify, within a given week, which investments occurred first and so we aggregate
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Column (1) contains the main sample and column (2) contains the survey sample. Artists
with both types of funders (in the previous week with investments) are more likely to receive
further funds. This is consistent with these artists having momentum in the funding process. In
contrast, artists with only F&F funders (in the previous week with investments) are no more likely
to receive funds. In the survey sample, where close F&F are particularly likely to be identified, the
coefficient is negative and significant with 90% confidence. With different signs and significance
across specifications, the results cannot be seen as definitive. Still, this suggests that, if anything,
other funders use the information in the identity of prior funders and potentially discount previous
investments by F&F.
Unfortunately, there is insufficient power in the data to split this analysis by overall amount
of funds raised to date. Therefore, the marginal effects are hard to assess. In other words, we
are comfortable saying that column (2) suggests some discounting, but the data do not allow us
to assess the degree to which this discounting reduces the main effect of funding following prior
funding.
Column (3) and (4) of Table 7 look at whether the identity of the investor can provide other
information leading to more follow-on investments. In particular, these columns explore whether
the previous investment was by an investor in the top 25% of the overall investment distribution on
Sellaband in terms of dollars spent. The positive coefficient suggests that the choices of the largest
funders are amplified in terms of their correlation with later funding. Again, while not definitive,
this suggests that other funders use the information in the identity of prior funders and follow the
leading participants on the platform.
5 Conclusion
Motivated by the recent rise in crowdfunding and the wide geographic dispersion of crowdfunding
investments, we examine the role of distance in an online platform for financing new artists. A
key challenge to crowdfunding markets, like many other online marketplaces, is the information
asymmetry between funders and the recipients of the funds. For other early-stage investments,
to the week level.
18
these asymmetries are partly overcome through information most easily gleaned via co-location.
Crowdfunding, however, often happens at a distance.
We explore whether and how distant and local funders differ. We show that they respond
differently to information about prior investment decisions. Our results suggest that the different
responses relate to the likelihood that F&F (who are disproportionately local) identify a given artist
as a worthy recipient of funds.
Specifically, we find that investment patterns over time are not strongly related to the geographic
distance between artist and funder after controlling for the artist’s oﬄine social network. This result
contrasts with the existing literature that emphasizes the importance of spatial proximity in early-
stage financing. Instead, our result suggests that online mechanisms can reduce economic frictions
associated with such investments over long distances. Only the spatial correlation of pre-existing
social networks is not resolved; the online mechanisms do not (yet) eliminate frictions related
to preexisting social networks. The persistence of such “social frictions” but not other distance-
related frictions is consistent with prior research on online activity that shows many but not all
distance-related frictions are reduced in the online setting (Blum and Goldfarb 2006, Hortacsu,
Martinez-Jerez, and Douglas 2009).
Broadly, this paper is a theory-driven study of crowdfunding. To clarify its scope, our results
are not meant to test general theories of capital markets, entrepreneurial finance, or social networks.
At the same time, our results are more than an exploratory description of the data.
Basic theory helps us identify and understand that asymmetric information, in terms of iden-
tifying worthwhile investments and monitoring the recipients of funds, may be a key challenge for
crowdfunding. Because this challenge is likely to be larger for distant funders, we focus on differ-
ences between local and distant investment patterns to explore these differences. We test theory
concerning geographic distance, social relationships, and information. We recognize that there are
several reasons that the geographic distance between artists and potential funders might matter,
such as spatially correlated tastes, monitoring progress, search frictions, and reputation effects re-
lated to trust and the risks associated with fraud or managerial incompetence. We demonstrate
that what appears to be a geographic distance effect is mostly a social effect. Although it is likely
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that co-location influences the likelihood of establishing social connections, it is pre-existing social
relationships that serve as the mechanism through which geographic distance matters. We then
show that it is unlikely that monitoring is the reason that social relationships matter. Instead,
the difference between socially connected funders and others seems to be driven by differences in
information used to identify the investment consideration set. We also present some suggestive
(though inconclusive) evidence that later funders may recognize and discount the information in
funds from F&F.
Our paper has several limitations that affect the scope of the interpretation. Two central ones
concern generalizability and the motivations of F&F. First, the sample is from a single crowdfunding
platform and thus the results may not generalize to other platforms with different market design
features.
Second, although Sellaband provides revenue-sharing opportunities for funders, it is plausible
that funders view their funding decisions more like philanthropic donations than investments seeking
to maximize the risk-adjusted rate of return. In that case, F&F may invest earlier than non-F&F
due to their social ties (e.g., social obligation, reciprocal F&F arrangements, utility from helping
a friend) rather than due to different information as we have assumed. If so, then perhaps non-
F&F erroneously interpret this investment as a signal of value, mistakenly assuming that prior
investments were motivated by expected payoff rather than by social ties. In other words, F&F
investment decisions may be biased and therefore the information in their signal may be misleading.
Our suggestive evidence of discounting of F&F funding and amplification of large investor funding
suggests that some participants on the platform may be aware of the information in the identity of
prior funders.
To the extent the evidence does not suggest complete discounting of prior F&F funding, it is
important to recall that there is significant variation in the level to which artists receive funding
from F&F. In fact, thousands of artists on the platform receive very little funding support from
anyone, including F&F. That is at least partly due to differences in the wealth endowment of F&F
associated with different artists. However, the variation in F&F investment across artists is also
likely to be partly due to variation in artists ability to garner confidence from their F&F networks.
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It seems unlikely that there is no information contained in the variation in the ability of artists to
attract financial support from F&F. If an artist is not able to convince even their F&F to invest in
their project, then that conveys useful information to potential investors that are non-F&F. Even a
little information in this signal may systematically influence non-F&F behavior. In other words, if
non-F&F respond to this information, whether erroneously or not, then this behaviour is consistent
with our interpretation that non-F&F invest later because they are in part reacting to information
from prior investors embedded in the total capital raised to date. This is an interesting area for
future research as the industry matures.
One may also worry that perhaps non-F&F invest later than F&F because the artist becomes
more visible as the artist is pushed up the rankings, which is more relevant for non-F&F than F&F.
This is consistent with our interpretation that the difference in timing of investment is likely due
to information that influences heuristics associated with forming a consideration set. Alternatively,
one may be concerned that non-F&F invest later because they derive more utility from making
investments in projects that are actually close to reaching the target because they feel they can
have more of an impact. This is plausible and one of the reasons that we carefully examine funder
behaviour on subsequent funding rounds. Our result that the difference between F&F and non-
F&F propensity to invest at different cumulative funding levels disappears after the first investment
suggests that, conditional on making more than one investment in the same artist, F&F and non-
F&F do not seem to be different in terms of the utility they derive from helping artists who have
already raised some funding to cross the finish line. Furthermore, to the extent that investors
who have made an initial investment then use information from monitoring the artists subsequent
activities to influence their decision to make subsequent investments in the same artist, we are
able to rule out differences in information related to monitoring between F&F and non-F&F (due
to oﬄine relationships, for example) as an explanation for differences in funding behaviour. The
difference between F&F and non-F&F propensity to invest in a given week at different cumulative
funding levels disappears after the first investment.
These limitations, combined with our results on distance and social networks, suggest an addi-
tional potential interpretation of our results. Social information is unlikely to be perfectly codified
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on a platform, suggesting that the role of geographic proximity may be relatively large when the
financial returns are small relative to the social nature of crowdfunding investments. Given that
funders appear to rely on information revealed by the funding decisions of others, F&F might
play an important role in generating that information and signaling value (Conti, Thursby, and
Rothaermel 2011). However, if subsequent funders erroneously interpret F&F funding as a signal
of quality, then the crowdfunding platform may inefficiently allocate funds to lower quality projects
by socially connected artists. Our evidence suggests something in the middle: there is likely some,
but not complete, discounting by platform participants.
Our results also inform and link the literatures on home bias and networks in investment
decisions. Consistent with the social networks results in Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), Hsu
(2007), and elsewhere, we find that networks affect investment patterns and that their relationship
can help explain patterns in home bias (Seasholes and Zhu 2005). Speculatively, this may help pin
down the type of information discussed in Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) that allows home
bias to persist when information flows are global.
Finally, we comment on the implications of crowdfunding for our particular industry setting,
recorded music. This industry has experienced a significant decline in revenues, approximately 50%
over 10 years, which many experts attribute to piracy through online file sharing (Passman 2009,
Rob and Waldfogel 2006). At the same time, costs associated with the production and distribution
of music have also dropped substantially due to the development of inexpensive production software
and the digital distribution of music over the internet. However, production costs are not zero, and
recording artists are commonly cash constrained. In the traditional vertically integrated industry
set-up, large record companies provide both financing and a full suite of services (e.g., producer,
studio, cover design, distribution, auxiliary musicians) in exchange for ownership of or equity in
the artist’s intellectual property. As the major labels decline in importance, artists have fewer
options to relieve cash constraints by borrowing against or selling equity in their current and future
intellectual property. Crowdfunding may help overcome that constraint by creating a market for
investing in the most salient assets available to aspiring new artists – their ideas, vision, and future
intellectual property – who can leverage their (local) social networks to access a much larger pool
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of capital from (distant) strangers.
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Table 1: Descriptive stats: $50K (main) Sample
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Artist Level
Funders at $50K 34 608.8 220.9 316 1,338
Weeks to $50K 34 53.1 34.6 8 124
Songs uploaded† 34 4.29 8.02 0 32
Videos uploaded 34 0.68 0.47 0 1
Funder level
Number of 50K artists invested in 8,149 2.54 4.23 1 34
Number of distinct investments 8,149 4.33 12.78 1 330
Total amount invested across 50K artists ($) 8,149 227 1,147.6 10 33,430
Artist-Funder level
Investment amount ($) 18,827 89 393.9 10 23,500
Geographic distance (km) 18,827 5,118 5,658 0.003 19,827
Number of investments in same artist 18,827 1.7 2.3 1 72
Position in funding cycle at first investment ($) 18,827 12,099 13,361 0 49,990
Artist-Funder-Week level
Investment amount ($) 709,471 2.378 40.82 0 15,000
Live show proximate to funder 709,471 0.002 0.046 0 1
†Artists may upload one to three songs when registering on the website. Since we do not have
access to these data, we do not include initial songs in this count.
Table 2: Friends and Family: $50K (main) Sample
F&F Not F&F
F&F use the website differently
Average # of emails sent to artists 0.22 1.74
Average # of comments sent to artists 0.41 2.69
Average # of emails received from artists 12.39 14.40
Average # of comments received from artists 1.02 3.95
Average amount invested $20.65 $6.38
F&F are disproportionately active at the beginning
First 4 Weeks 33% 67%
First $500 21% 79%
Full $50K 19% 81%
F&F are disproportionately local
Local (0-100 km) Artist-Funder Pairs 63% 37%
Distant (>100 km) Artist-Funder Pairs 16% 84%
Number of Artist-Funder Pairs 6% 94%
(586) (9,214)
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Table 3: Local, Distant, and Friends & Family
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0213*** 0.0083 0.0216*** 0.0340** 0.0236***
(0.0045) (0.0133) (0.0048) (0.0158) (0.0049)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0261*** -0.0225 0.0290*** 0.0307 0.0336***
(0.0072) (0.0171) (0.0076) (0.0212) (0.0074)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0420*** -0.0255 0.0458*** 0.0377 0.0527***
(0.0099) (0.0209) (0.0107) (0.0225) (0.0103)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0840*** -0.0137 0.0902*** 0.0639** 0.1099***
(0.0198) (0.0267) (0.0210) (0.0254) (0.0213)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0898*** -0.0876***
(0.0315) (0.0311)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1301*** -0.1346***
(0.0339) (0.0359)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1507*** -0.1657***
(0.0320) (0.0357)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1812*** -0.2533***
(0.0312) (0.0389)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0079 0.0105 -0.0072 0.0098 -0.0062
(0.0061) (0.0103) (0.0096) (0.0110) (0.0099)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0033*** -0.0041*** -0.0031*** -0.0035*** -0.0030***
(0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0010)
Observations 709,471 78,897 630,574 78,897 630,574
R-squared 0.012 0.039 0.012 0.049 0.018
Number of group 18,827 1,572 17,255 1,572 17,255
Dependent variable is any investment and the unit of observation is the $50K artist-funder-week.
Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include a full set of fixed effects
for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors clustered at
the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Local, Distant, and Friends & Family (Survey Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0203** 0.0145 0.0201** 0.0370* 0.0213**
(0.0073) (0.0196) (0.0076) (0.0199) (0.0078)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0263** -0.0122 0.0283** 0.0155 0.0296**
(0.0098) (0.0244) (0.0104) (0.0245) (0.0106)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0441*** -0.0152 0.0482*** 0.0188 0.0496***
(0.0137) (0.0289) (0.0148) (0.0308) (0.0151)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0964*** -0.0005 0.1042*** 0.0319 0.1069***
(0.0215) (0.0379) (0.0232) (0.0372) (0.0238)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0604* -0.1204***
(0.0337) (0.0317)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0669* -0.1300***
(0.0342) (0.0346)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0780** -0.1412***
(0.0303) (0.0304)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.0826*** -0.1977***
(0.0285) (0.0436)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0128* 0.0165 -0.0068 0.0164 -0.0064
(0.0065) (0.0122) (0.0161) (0.0130) (0.0159)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Observations 414,835 64,403 350,432 64,403 350,432
R-squared 0.014 0.047 0.015 0.050 0.016
Number of group 9,800 1,096 8,704 1,096 8,704
Dependent variable is any investment and sample is the survey sample (i.e. includes all
investments in the artists who identified their Friends and Family). The unit of observation
is the survey artist-funder-week. Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All
regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and
each week. Robust standard errors clustered at the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Repeated Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0393*** 0.0326** 0.0400*** 0.0411*** 0.0407***
(0.0067) (0.0135) (0.0068) (0.0149) (0.0068)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0613*** 0.0300 0.0632*** 0.0483** 0.0648***
(0.0098) (0.0187) (0.0100) (0.0217) (0.0102)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0967*** 0.0361 0.1012*** 0.0727*** 0.1039***
(0.0126) (0.0214) (0.0136) (0.0241) (0.0137)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.1969*** 0.1024*** 0.2036*** 0.1291*** 0.2094***
(0.0287) (0.0332) (0.0302) (0.0335) (0.0304)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0242 -0.0265*
(0.0155) (0.0149)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0433** -0.0462*
(0.0175) (0.0236)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0805*** -0.0744***
(0.0227) (0.0236)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.0665** -0.1160***
(0.0297) (0.0229)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0105 0.0129 -0.0122 0.0130 -0.0121
(0.0128) (0.0169) (0.0262) (0.0169) (0.0262)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0008* 0.0012*** -0.0008* 0.0014*** -0.0008*
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Observations 213,133 20,127 193,006 20,127 193,006
R-squared 0.028 0.027 0.030 0.029 0.031
Number of group 5,213 449 4,764 449 4,764
Dependent variable is any investment and sample and the unit of observation is the $50K
artist-funder-week. Only funders who invest at least twice in the focal artist are included.
Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include a full set of fixed
effects for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week. Robust standard errors
clustered at the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Repeated Investment (Survey Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0339*** 0.0439** 0.0327*** 0.0387** 0.0328***
(0.0105) (0.0170) (0.0107) (0.0167) (0.0107)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0607*** 0.0410 0.0613*** 0.0385 0.0617***
(0.0152) (0.0251) (0.0158) (0.0225) (0.0162)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0950*** 0.0428 0.0991*** 0.0492* 0.0999***
(0.0186) (0.0282) (0.0199) (0.0269) (0.0203)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.2092*** 0.1140** 0.2165*** 0.1432*** 0.2181***
(0.0332) (0.0425) (0.0344) (0.0448) (0.0348)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F 0.0132 -0.0125
(0.0148) (0.0271)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F 0.0064 -0.0228
(0.0201) (0.0349)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0125 -0.0407
(0.0242) (0.0377)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.0618 -0.0778
(0.0370) (0.0586)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0233* 0.0301 -0.0139 0.0289 -0.0135
(0.0133) (0.0179) (0.0326) (0.0179) (0.0323)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0013*** 0.0012** -0.0013*** 0.0014** -0.0013***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Observations 119,630 14,798 104,832 14,798 104,832
R-squared 0.028 0.029 0.032 0.030 0.032
Number of group 2,690 283 2,407 283 2,407
Dependent variable is any investment and sample is the survey sample. The unit of obser-
vation is the survey artist-funder-week. Only funders who invest at least twice in the focal
artist are included. Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include
a full set of fixed effects for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week. Robust
standard errors clustered at the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7: Last Investment by F&F or Large Investor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Main Sample Survey Sample Main Sample Survey Sample
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0182*** 0.0148** 0.0182*** 0.0173**
(0.0039) (0.0057) (0.0041) (0.0062)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0245*** 0.0218** 0.0218*** 0.0222**
(0.0063) (0.0078) (0.0068) (0.0087)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0387*** 0.0390*** 0.0369*** 0.0391***
(0.0087) (0.0116) (0.0095) (0.0128)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0805*** 0.0890*** 0.0784*** 0.0902***
(0.0186) (0.0193) (0.0196) (0.0207)
Last Investment by F&F 0.0024 -0.0339*
(0.0052) (0.0172)
Last investment by F&F 0.0091** 0.0454**
and Not-F&F (0.0044) (0.0174)
Large Investor (Lagged) 0.0205** 0.0203**
(0.0095) (0.0090)
Both Large and Small 0.0085*** 0.0066***
Investor (Lagged) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Funder proximate to 0.0091 0.0097 0.0061 0.0112
Live Show (0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0066)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0019*** -0.0008*** -0.0035*** -0.0005*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0003)
Observations 703,417 411,454 709,471 414,835
R-squared 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.015
Number of groups 18,827 9,800 18,827 9,800
Dependent variable is any investment. Sample is the $50K sample in columns(1) and (3)
and the survey sample in columns (2) and (4). “Last investment by F&F” is equal to one
if the last week with investment only had investment by F&F. “Last investment by F&F
and Not-F&F” is equal to one if the last week with investment had investment by F&F
and Not-F&F. Large investor is defined as an investor in the top 25% of the investment
distribution. The unit of observation is the artist-funder-week. All regressions include
a full set of fixed effects for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(a) Local versus distant funders
(b) F&F versus not-F&F funders (both local and distant)
Figure 1: Relative propensity to fund over capital levels. Baseline is propensity to fund between
$0-10K within focal group. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard
errors clustered at the artist level.
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A For Online Publication - Appendix **UPDATE b/SUBMIT!!**
Table A-1 Full sample descriptives (p. OA-2)
Robustness to different samples
Table A-2 Full Sample (p. OA-3)
Table A-3 Sample of entrepreneurs who reach $5,000 in investments (p. OA-4)
Table A-4 Sample constructed by dropping entrepreneurs from the music hubs (p. OA-5)
Table A-5 Including only funders who fund two or more times (p. OA-6)
Table A-6 Entrepreneur-funder-month as unit of analysis (p. OA-7)
Robustness to additional covariates
Table A-7 Video uploads (p. OA-8)
Table A-8 Song uploads (p. OA-9)
Table A-9 Videos and songs (p. OA-10)
Table A-10 Removing focal funder’s past investment from artist’s accumulated capital (p. OA-11)
Table A-11 Whether the entrepreneur appeared in the Sellaband Newsletter (p. OA-12)
Functional form
Table A-12 Fixed-effects logit (p. OA-13)
Table A-13 Fixed-effects poisson regression on the total parts invested (p. OA-14)
Table A-14 Linear regression on the total parts invested (p. OA-15)
Table A-15 Random effects (p. OA-16)
Additional robustness checks
Tables A-16 50km as “local” (p. OA-17)
Tables A-17 200km as “local” (p. OA-18)
Table A-18 Treating missing geographic information as distant (p. OA-19)
Table A-19 Combining distant and local in the same regression and using interactions (p. OA-20)
Table A-20 Alternative definitions of F&F (p. OA-21)
OA-1
Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics
Full Sample
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Artist Level
Funders 4,712 11.4 60.5 1 1,338
Total Investment 4,712 492.94 4375.3 0 50,000
Songs uploaded† 4,712 1.82 2.686 0 59
Videos uploaded 4,712 0.11 0.378 0 8
Funder level
Number of artists invested in 15,517 3.46 21.1 1 1,835
Number of distinct investments 15,517 5.52 34.31 1 2,155
Total amount invested across all artists ($) 15,517 226.1 1579.4 10 69,560
Artist-Funder level
Investment amount ($) 24,862 86.37 381.35 10 23,500
Geographic distance (km) 24,862 4,831.5 5,523.6 .003 19,863
Number of investments in same artist 24,862 1.79 2.52 1 72
Position in funding cycle at first investment ($) 24,862 9,998 12,464 0 49,990
Artist-Funder-Week level
Investment amount ($) 1,175,492 1.83 33.71 0 15,000
†Artists may upload one to three songs when registering on the website. Since we do not have
access to these data, we do not include initial songs in this count.
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Table A-21: Listing age controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0236*** 0.0111 0.0223*** 0.0399*** 0.0249***
(0.0051) (0.0130) (0.0055) (0.0140) (0.0057)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0286*** -0.0181 0.0293*** 0.0342 0.0345***
(0.0072) (0.0156) (0.0077) (0.0203) (0.0075)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0467*** -0.0224 0.0486*** 0.0414* 0.0557***
(0.0096) (0.0195) (0.0103) (0.0223) (0.0101)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0902*** -0.0082 0.0936*** 0.0716*** 0.1128***
(0.0182) (0.0234) (0.0195) (0.0232) (0.0201)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0932*** -0.0897***
(0.0262) (0.0313)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1270*** -0.1347***
(0.0281) (0.0351)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1463*** -0.1664***
(0.0263) (0.0345)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1776*** -0.2534***
(0.0262) (0.0382)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0093 0.0133 -0.0068 0.0119 -0.0061
(0.0064) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0106)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0017 -0.0260*** -0.0002 -0.0256*** -0.0008
(0.0032) (0.0055) (0.0034) (0.0049) (0.0033)
Weeks on Sellaband2 -0.0003 0.0010*** -0.0003 0.0010*** -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Weeks on Sellaband3 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weeks on Sellaband4 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weeks on Sellaband5 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weeks on Sellaband6 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 709,471 78,897 630,574 78,897 630,574
R-squared 0.012 0.049 0.012 0.058 0.019
Number of group 18,827 1,572 17,255 1,572 17,255
Dependent variable is any investment and the unit of observation is the $50K artist-funder-week.
Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include a full set of fixed effects
for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week, as well as a flexible polynomial of
listing age. Robust standard errors clustered at the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-22: Listing age controls (Survey Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0225*** 0.0104 0.0196** 0.0289 0.0209**
(0.0077) (0.0179) (0.0087) (0.0169) (0.0090)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0268** -0.0138 0.0260** 0.0076 0.0274**
(0.0101) (0.0205) (0.0113) (0.0208) (0.0116)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0455*** -0.0163 0.0470*** 0.0118 0.0485***
(0.0141) (0.0240) (0.0154) (0.0259) (0.0157)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0994*** -0.0050 0.1034*** 0.0220 0.1062***
(0.0225) (0.0329) (0.0243) (0.0336) (0.0249)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0484* -0.1209***
(0.0274) (0.0326)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0511* -0.1294***
(0.0255) (0.0346)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0626** -0.1412***
(0.0217) (0.0300)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.0656** -0.1972***
(0.0234) (0.0434)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0131* 0.0145 -0.0079 0.0145 -0.0075
(0.0067) (0.0125) (0.0156) (0.0129) (0.0154)
Weeks on Sellaband 0.0022 -0.0282*** 0.0037 -0.0278*** 0.0037
(0.0035) (0.0084) (0.0036) (0.0078) (0.0036)
Weeks on Sellaband2 -0.0003 0.0014** -0.0004 0.0014*** -0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0003)
Weeks on Sellaband3 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000** 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weeks on Sellaband4 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weeks on Sellaband5 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000* -0.0000 0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Weeks on Sellaband6 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000* 0.0000 -0.0000*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Observations 414,835 64,403 350,432 64,403 350,432
R-squared 0.015 0.057 0.015 0.058 0.016
Number of group 9,800 1,096 8,704 1,096 8,704
Dependent variable is any investment and sample is the survey sample (i.e. includes all
investments in the artists who identified their Friends and Family). The unit of observation is
the survey artist-funder-week. Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions
include a full set of fixed effects for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week, as
well as a flexible polynomial of listing age. Robust standard errors clustered at the artist level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-23: Listing-months fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0234*** 0.0129 0.0224*** 0.0416*** 0.0252***
(0.0051) (0.0127) (0.0056) (0.0144) (0.0057)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0288*** -0.0188 0.0297*** 0.0318 0.0347***
(0.0070) (0.0154) (0.0076) (0.0204) (0.0075)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0459*** -0.0235 0.0479*** 0.0399* 0.0548***
(0.0093) (0.0189) (0.0101) (0.0218) (0.0098)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0901*** -0.0091 0.0940*** 0.0715*** 0.1139***
(0.0182) (0.0232) (0.0194) (0.0231) (0.0201)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0905*** -0.0893***
(0.0253) (0.0314)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.1219*** -0.1346***
(0.0266) (0.0351)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.1429*** -0.1665***
(0.0250) (0.0348)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1749*** -0.2533***
(0.0257) (0.0387)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0082 0.0135 -0.0066 0.0122 -0.0058
(0.0063) (0.0102) (0.0095) (0.0105) (0.0101)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0039*** -0.0045*** -0.0038*** -0.0040*** -0.0036***
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0011)
Observations 709,471 78,897 630,574 78,897 630,574
R-squared 0.013 0.051 0.013 0.059 0.019
Number of group 18,827 1,572 17,255 1,572 17,255
Dependent variable is any investment and the unit of observation is the $50K artist-funder-week.
Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include a full set of fixed
effects for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week, as well fixed effects for months
since the artist listed on the platform. Robust standard errors clustered at the artist level in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-24: Listing-months fixed effects (Survey Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0213** 0.0146 0.0192** 0.0332* 0.0205**
(0.0076) (0.0174) (0.0087) (0.0176) (0.0090)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0257** -0.0160 0.0258** 0.0056 0.0272**
(0.0096) (0.0206) (0.0108) (0.0197) (0.0112)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0428*** -0.0234 0.0450** 0.0042 0.0465***
(0.0136) (0.0227) (0.0156) (0.0236) (0.0158)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0999*** -0.0088 0.1050*** 0.0172 0.1079***
(0.0215) (0.0315) (0.0236) (0.0317) (0.0242)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0470* -0.1206***
(0.0239) (0.0322)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0493** -0.1289***
(0.0214) (0.0341)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0593*** -0.1407***
(0.0183) (0.0300)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.0603*** -0.1966***
(0.0191) (0.0433)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0127* 0.0153 -0.0096 0.0153 -0.0092
(0.0070) (0.0113) (0.0152) (0.0117) (0.0151)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0016) (0.0006)
Observations 414,835 64,403 350,432 64,403 350,432
R-squared 0.016 0.063 0.016 0.064 0.017
Number of group 9,800 1,096 8,704 1,096 8,704
Dependent variable is any investment and sample is the survey sample (i.e. includes all
investments in the artists who identified their Friends and Family). The unit of observation
is the survey artist-funder-week. Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All
regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and
each week, as well fixed effects for months since the artist listed on the platform. Robust
standard errors clustered at the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OA-25
Table A-25: Large investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0248*** 0.0189*** 0.0250*** 0.0335*** 0.0258***
(0.0014) (0.0062) (0.0014) (0.0071) (0.0014)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0331*** -0.0078 0.0359*** 0.0250*** 0.0387***
(0.0018) (0.0080) (0.0019) (0.0091) (0.0019)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0472*** -0.0174** 0.0516*** 0.0094 0.0537***
(0.0023) (0.0088) (0.0024) (0.0111) (0.0024)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0706*** -0.0081 0.0763*** 0.0332* 0.0861***
(0.0033) (0.0128) (0.0035) (0.0200) (0.0037)
Large Investment (lagged) 0.0250*** 0.0607*** 0.0226*** 0.0304*** 0.0184***
(0.0013) (0.0083) (0.0013) (0.0088) (0.0012)
$10-20K accum. capital * Large Inv. -0.0156*** -0.0412*** -0.0144*** -0.0209** -0.0117***
(0.0016) (0.0088) (0.0017) (0.0096) (0.0016)
$20-30K accum. capital * Large Inv. -0.0186*** -0.0523*** -0.0170*** -0.0135 -0.0136***
(0.0016) (0.0088) (0.0016) (0.0104) (0.0017)
$30-40K accum. capital * Large Inv. -0.0169*** -0.0432*** -0.0160*** 0.0159 -0.0078***
(0.0019) (0.0091) (0.0020) (0.0130) (0.0021)
$40-50K accum. capital * Large Inv. 0.0056* -0.0434*** 0.0082** 0.0123 0.0218***
(0.0031) (0.0132) (0.0033) (0.0214) (0.0035)
Large Investment (lagged) * F&F 0.0532*** 0.0782***
(0.0154) (0.0095)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0624*** -0.0568***
(0.0107) (0.0064)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0879*** -0.0932***
(0.0112) (0.0066)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0824*** -0.0961***
(0.0128) (0.0073)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.1134*** -0.1607***
(0.0197) (0.0082)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F * Large Inv. -0.0345** -0.0609***
(0.0165) (0.0106)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F * Large Inv. -0.0685*** -0.0731***
(0.0166) (0.0099)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F * Large Inv. -0.1024*** -0.1155***
(0.0183) (0.0104)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F * Large Inv. -0.0945*** -0.1373***
(0.0248) (0.0111)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0106* 0.0110 0.0039 0.0109 0.0058
(0.0056) (0.0076) (0.0160) (0.0076) (0.0159)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0018*** -0.0016* -0.0018*** -0.0010 -0.0016***
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002)
Observations 703,417 78,685 624,732 78,685 624,732
R-squared 0.012 0.039 0.013 0.049 0.019
Number of group 18,827 1,572 17,255 1,572 17,255
Dependent variable is any investment and the unit of observation is the $50K artist-funder-week. Local is
defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each artist-funder
pair (differenced out) and each week. Investment is defined as large if it falls in the top 10% of the investment
distribution. Robust standard errors clustered at the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OA-26
Table A-26: Large investments (Survey Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0242*** 0.0310*** 0.0225*** 0.0399*** 0.0228***
(0.0020) (0.0077) (0.0022) (0.0076) (0.0022)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0318*** 0.0051 0.0326*** 0.0190** 0.0330***
(0.0025) (0.0096) (0.0026) (0.0092) (0.0026)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0497*** -0.0017 0.0525*** 0.0150 0.0529***
(0.0029) (0.0103) (0.0031) (0.0102) (0.0031)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.0723*** -0.0017 0.0777*** 0.0152 0.0785***
(0.0044) (0.0174) (0.0047) (0.0168) (0.0048)
Large Investment (lagged) 0.0242*** 0.0741*** 0.0202*** 0.0490*** 0.0189***
(0.0019) (0.0115) (0.0019) (0.0108) (0.0019)
$10-20K accum. capital * Large Inv. -0.0159*** -0.0636*** -0.0124*** -0.0353*** -0.0108***
(0.0023) (0.0123) (0.0024) (0.0116) (0.0024)
$20-30K accum. capital * Large Inv. -0.0187*** -0.0648*** -0.0155*** -0.0409*** -0.0141***
(0.0022) (0.0122) (0.0022) (0.0115) (0.0022)
$30-40K accum. capital * Large Inv. -0.0213*** -0.0614*** -0.0180*** -0.0291** -0.0164***
(0.0025) (0.0124) (0.0026) (0.0120) (0.0026)
$40-50K accum. capital * Large Inv. 0.0137*** -0.0484*** 0.0186*** -0.0204 0.0213***
(0.0045) (0.0187) (0.0047) (0.0193) (0.0047)
Large Investment (lagged) * F&F 0.0590*** 0.0578**
(0.0216) (0.0279)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0198 -0.0675***
(0.0146) (0.0214)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0302** -0.0806***
(0.0144) (0.0214)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0336** -0.0861***
(0.0139) (0.0210)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.0480*** -0.1105***
(0.0155) (0.0262)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F * Large Inv. -0.0713*** -0.0709**
(0.0230) (0.0289)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F * Large Inv. -0.0554** -0.0614**
(0.0223) (0.0291)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F * Large Inv. -0.0754*** -0.0720**
(0.0229) (0.0303)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F * Large Inv. -0.0577** -0.1084***
(0.0256) (0.0362)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0134** 0.0164* -0.0030 0.0170* -0.0026
(0.0055) (0.0088) (0.0164) (0.0088) (0.0164)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0009*** -0.0063*** -0.0005*** -0.0062*** -0.0006***
(0.0003) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002)
Observations 411,454 64,258 347,196 64,258 347,196
R-squared 0.015 0.050 0.015 0.053 0.016
Number of group 9,800 1,096 8,704 1,096 8,704
Dependent variable is any investment and sample is the survey sample (i.e. includes all investments in the
artists who identified their Friends and Family). The unit of observation is the survey artist-funder-week. Local
is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each artist-funder
pair (differenced out) and each week. Investment is defined as large if it falls in the top 10% of the investment
distribution. Robust standard errors clustered at the artist level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OA-27
Table A-27: Repeated investment controlling for songs and videos uploaded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0371*** 0.0308** 0.0377*** 0.0390*** 0.0384***
(0.0063) (0.0129) (0.0065) (0.0142) (0.0064)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0586*** 0.0282 0.0605*** 0.0461** 0.0621***
(0.0094) (0.0181) (0.0097) (0.0210) (0.0098)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0936*** 0.0338 0.0980*** 0.0699*** 0.1007***
(0.0120) (0.0206) (0.0131) (0.0232) (0.0132)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.1935*** 0.0997*** 0.2002*** 0.1259*** 0.2061***
(0.0284) (0.0321) (0.0300) (0.0319) (0.0302)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F -0.0232 -0.0244
(0.0155) (0.0147)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F -0.0422** -0.0440*
(0.0175) (0.0234)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0792*** -0.0721***
(0.0229) (0.0236)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.0654** -0.1137***
(0.0291) (0.0230)
Songs uploaded (lagged) -0.0021 0.0044 -0.0024 0.0046 -0.0027
(0.0039) (0.0056) (0.0043) (0.0057) (0.0043)
Videos uploaded (lagged) -0.0272 -0.0001 -0.0291* 0.0041 -0.0285
(0.0181) (0.0773) (0.0171) (0.0751) (0.0171)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0089 0.0124 -0.0141 0.0127 -0.0140
(0.0124) (0.0163) (0.0259) (0.0163) (0.0258)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0012*** 0.0010 -0.0012*** 0.0011* -0.0012***
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Observations 211,348 20,062 191,286 20,062 191,286
R-squared 0.028 0.027 0.030 0.029 0.031
Number of group 5,213 449 4,764 449 4,764
Dependent variable is any investment and sample and the unit of observation is the $50K
artist-funder-week. Only funders who invest at least twice in the focal artist are included. Local
is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for
each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week. Controls for songs and videos uploaded
by the artist are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the artist level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OA-28
Table A-28: Repeated investment controlling for songs and videos uploaded (Survey Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES ALL LOCAL DISTANT LOCAL DISTANT
$10-20K accum. capital 0.0297*** 0.0414** 0.0282** 0.0365** 0.0282**
(0.0095) (0.0157) (0.0099) (0.0150) (0.0100)
$20-30K accum. capital 0.0562*** 0.0382 0.0565*** 0.0362 0.0568***
(0.0142) (0.0238) (0.0149) (0.0209) (0.0153)
$30-40K accum. capital 0.0897*** 0.0393 0.0934*** 0.0461* 0.0942***
(0.0169) (0.0267) (0.0184) (0.0249) (0.0188)
$40-50K accum. capital 0.2033*** 0.1089** 0.2105*** 0.1383*** 0.2121***
(0.0315) (0.0401) (0.0328) (0.0414) (0.0333)
$10-20K accum. capital * F&F 0.0125 -0.0096
(0.0143) (0.0275)
$20-30K accum. capital * F&F 0.0057 -0.0197
(0.0195) (0.0353)
$30-40K accum. capital * F&F -0.0131 -0.0374
(0.0231) (0.0381)
$40-50K accum. capital * F&F -0.0620* -0.0742
(0.0352) (0.0592)
Songs uploaded (lagged) -0.0069* 0.0033 -0.0082* 0.0029 -0.0081*
(0.0038) (0.0059) (0.0039) (0.0058) (0.0039)
Videos uploaded (lagged) -0.0391 0.0178 -0.0421* 0.0189 -0.0420*
(0.0255) (0.1291) (0.0229) (0.1293) (0.0228)
Funder proximate to Live Show 0.0210 0.0296 -0.0132 0.0283 -0.0128
(0.0128) (0.0173) (0.0330) (0.0173) (0.0327)
Weeks on Sellaband -0.0015*** 0.0012** -0.0015*** 0.0015*** -0.0015***
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Observations 118,589 14,750 103,839 14,750 103,839
R-squared 0.028 0.029 0.031 0.030 0.031
Number of group 2,690 283 2,407 283 2,407
Dependent variable is any investment and sample is the survey sample. The unit of observation
is the survey artist-funder-week. Only funders who invest at least twice in the focal artist are
included. Local is defined as within 100 km from the artist. All regressions include a full set of
fixed effects for each artist-funder pair (differenced out) and each week. Controls for songs and
videos uploaded by the artist are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the artist level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OA-29
